Scenario Adjustment in Stated Preference Research by Cameron, Trudy Ann et al.
 1 
 Version:  November 22, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Adjustment in Stated Preference Research 
 
 
 
Trudy Ann Cameron* 
Mikesell Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics 
Department of Economics, 435 PLC 
1285 University of Oregon 
Eugene, OR   97403-1285  USA 
cameron@uoregon.edu 
ph: (541) 346-1242 
fax: (541) 346-1243 
 
J.R. DeShazo 
Associate Professor 
Department of Public Policy 
3250 Public Policy Building 
University of California 
Los Angeles, CA   90095-1656  USA 
deshazo@ucla.edu  
 
Erica H. Johnson 
Ph.D. student 
Department of Economics, 435 PLC 
1285 University of Oregon 
Eugene, OR   97403-1285  USA 
ejohnso1@uoregon.edu  
 
 
* Corresponding author 
 
Acknowledgements:  We are grateful for the helpful comments of Paul Jakus and Edward Morey, 
and participants in our session at the 2007 AAEA/AERE meetings in Portland, OR.  This 
research has been supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-0551009) to 
the University of Oregon (PI:  Trudy Ann Cameron). It employs original survey data from an 
earlier project supported by the US Environmental Protection Agency (R829485) and Health 
Canada (Contract H5431-010041/001/SS). Additional support has been provided by the 
Raymond F. Mikesell Foundation at the University of Oregon. Office of Human Subjects 
Compliance approval filed as Protocol #C4-380-07F at the University of Oregon. This work has 
not been formally reviewed by any of the sponsoring agencies. Any remaining errors are our 
own.   
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Adjustment in Stated Preference Research 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Stated preference (SP) survey methods have been used increasingly to assess willingness 
to pay for a wide variety of non-market goods and services, including reductions in risks to life 
and health. Poorly designed SP studies are subject to a number of well-known biases, but many 
of these biases can be minimized when they are anticipated ex ante and accommodated in the 
study’s design or during data analysis. We identify another source of potential bias, which we 
call “scenario adjustment,” where respondents assume that the substantive alternative(s) in an SP 
choice set, in their own particular case, will be different than the survey instrument 
describes. We use an existing survey, developed to ascertain willingness to pay for private 
health-risk reduction programs, to demonstrate a strategy to control and correct for scenario 
adjustment in the estimation of willingness to pay. This strategy involves data from carefully 
worded follow-up questions and ex post econometric controls for each respondent’s subjective 
departures from the intended choice scenario. Our research has important implications for the 
design of future SP surveys. 
 
 
Keywords:  scenario adjustment, scenario rejection, stated preference, value of a statistical life 
(VSL), value of a statistical illness profile 
 
JEL Classifications:   C42, C35, Q51, I18 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent interest in behavioral economics had led researchers to revisit instances where 
conventional empirical models of rational consumer decision-making may have failed to provide 
an adequate picture of choice behavior.  Bernheim and Rangel (2009), for example, note that “it 
is often difficult to formulate coherent and normatively compelling rationalizations for non-
standard choice patterns” (i.e. when consumers do not choose in the way that our utility-
maximization models would predict).   
Researchers have also long recognized that subjective beliefs are an important 
determinant of consumers’ choices (Dominitz and Manski (2004); Manski (2004)). For example, 
individuals’ beliefs about the timing of their own risks for particular illnesses may determine 
their willingness to pay to reduce these health risks (e.g., to purchase organic foods), to measure 
their risks (e.g., to purchase a new diagnostic test not currently covered by insurance), or to buy 
extra insurance against undesirable health risk outcomes (e.g., to purchase Medi-Gap policies).  
As subjective beliefs change, individual behavior will probably change as well.  The individual’s 
subjective beliefs are an example of “ancillary conditions” associated with a choice, as described 
in Bernheim and Rangel (2009).   
As ancillary conditions for choices, subjective beliefs are likely to play an important role 
when research subjects answer questions in stated preference (SP) surveys used to value non-
market goods.  An SP survey describes a scenario in which the respondent is offered a 
hypothetical opportunity to purchase one or more costly programs that yield particular sets of 
individual-specific consequences. When asked to make choices about health-related programs, 
for example, individuals may hold strong prior beliefs about many aspects of the alternatives in 
the choice scenario, including their own risks of particular illnesses, the time profile of those 
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illness-specific risks over their lifetimes, the effectiveness of preventive actions, the 
effectiveness of the probable treatments, etc.  When respondents hold prior beliefs about any 
aspect of the scenario that diverge from the researcher-prescribed information, three possibilities 
arise:  (1) respondents may replace their beliefs about aspects of the scenario with the 
information provided by the researcher; (2) they may retain their beliefs and instead reject the 
choice scenario as irrelevant or unrealistic, often resulting in a protest response, and (3) they may 
accept the scenario but “adjust” some of its informational aspects to fit their own personal 
situation, history or context.  We define “scenario adjustment” to occur in the third case, where 
respondents impute or modify some aspect of a given choice scenario based upon their personal 
beliefs, which constitute ancillary conditions for these types of choices.   
This paper concerns the identification of scenario adjustment as a behavioral 
phenomenon affecting choices.  We also illustrate one strategy for correction.  We take 
advantage of an existing stated preference survey concerning prospective health risk reductions, 
described in Cameron and DeShazo (2009).  This survey is designed to elicit choices that allow 
the researcher to infer willingness to pay for privately purchased diagnostic programs which 
reduce the prospective risk that respondents will experience specific illness profiles over their 
remaining lifespans.  An illness profile consists of a description of a sequence of future health 
states associated with a major illness that the respondent may experience with some baseline 
probability.  The specific type of “scenario adjustment” problem we address in this paper has to 
do with each respondent’s degree of acceptance of the stated latency of the illness (i.e. time until 
the onset of symptoms).  Latency is specified as an attribute of each illness profile described in 
the choice sets used in the survey.  
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Our assessment of the consequences of scenario adjustment (and thus our potential 
correction strategy) is made possible because our respondents are asked appropriate debriefing 
questions after each stated choice question concerning alternative health-risk reduction programs.  
These debriefing questions allow us to distinguish between respondents who appear to accept the 
latency information given in the choice scenario (and therefore presumably answer the choice 
question based on the latencies described in the choice scenario) from those who subjectively 
adjust the latency information in the scenario (and therefore appear to have answered a 
somewhat different question).  Some individuals underestimate the latency period—they believe 
that the program’s benefits, in their own case, would start sooner.  Other individuals 
overestimate the latency period.  If subjective latency affects willingness to pay (WTP) for risk 
reductions, then respondents’ latency perceptions can influence their estimated WTP amounts.1  
If scenario adjustment is ignored, it is possible that this behavior on the part of 
respondents may cause the researcher to underestimate WTP for some respondents and 
overestimate WTP for others, to varying degrees. The opposing effects are unlikely to be exactly 
offsetting.  In cases like this, researchers should probably calculate and compare estimates of 
WTP both with and without corrections for scenario adjustment. But this implies that as early as 
the process of survey design, researchers should try to anticipate the dimensions along which 
respondents may be inclined to adjust the stated choice scenario, despite the survey designer’s 
best efforts. Suitable debriefing questions need to be included in the survey to permit a formal 
assessment of the extent of this behavior. 
                                                 
1 “Scenario adjustment” might occur as follows.  Suppose a male respondent has a family history of heart disease at 
age fifty.  In his copy of the survey, the stated choice scenario that involves heart disease may specify that this 
illness would lead to moderate and/or severe pain and disability starting at age seventy.  However, given his private 
knowledge, he might answer the question as though the benefits of the proposed risk reduction program would begin 
at age fifty.  
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We note that corrections for scenario adjustment must be considered in relation to the 
practice of  “libertarian paternalism” as discussed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and Smith 
(2007).  “Libertarian paternalism” involves honoring consumer sovereignty to the greatest extent 
possible (the libertarian part), but intervening to override some aspects of behavior when the 
researcher believes that these are mistakes (the paternalism part).  For example, suppose the 
researcher is attempting to value removal of the health risks associated with a toxic waste site.  
The survey may state a particular objective existing risk, but one-third of the survey’s 
respondents may believe that the risk is ten times as large as the objective risk.  The model could 
be estimated based on each individual’s subjective risks. However, to generate an estimate of 
social benefits based on the objective risks, the researcher may counterfactually simulate what 
this third of the sample would have been willing to pay, had they believed the lower objective 
risks instead.  Scenario adjustment, as described in this paper, likewise involves simulating the 
preference parameters that would have been estimated. In this case, the counterfactual is the case 
where do not approach the choice using their own subjective estimates of latency, but instead 
“buy” the attributes of each illness profile as described in the survey. 
There is one final consideration when considering scenario adjustment in stated 
preference studies.  Individuals may likewise adjust choice scenarios in real-life choice situations.  
If “scenario adjustment” happens with similar frequency in actual markets, then perhaps these 
misalignments are an unavoidable part of how consumers truly behave in real markets. If a stated 
preference study is designed to predict future actual choice behavior, perhaps the SP choice 
models should allow people to make the same “mistakes” that they would make in real life. 
However, if the goal is welfare assessment based on WTP under conditions of full information, 
then corrections are more justified. Of course, if scenario adjustment is for some reason more 
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pronounced in hypothetical choice scenarios, as opposed to real market conditions, then perhaps 
the researcher should correct the misalignment in order to more accurately predict respondents’ 
WTP under real conditions. 
The empirical contribution of this paper is to identify and illustrate one case of scenario 
adjustment by respondents to a stated preference survey, and to demonstrate the potential 
consequences of this behavior for the resulting estimates of WTP. The paper proceeds as follows: 
Section 2 reviews in more detail the related literature on perceptions and SP.  Section 3 briefly 
describes our survey and the data it produces.  Section 4 briefly reviews a utility-theoretic choice 
model used to analyze respondents’ program preferences.  Section 5 discusses how to control for 
scenario adjustment and conveys our empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.   
2. Related Literature 
   
Researchers certainly recognize that respondents bring their beliefs and perceptions about 
aspects of a choice scenario into a choice setting (Manski, 2004).2  Researchers are also aware 
that the information provided in an SP choice scenario may conflict with respondents’ beliefs 
and perceptions, in some cases because of the random assignment of attributes in efficiently 
designed conjoint choice sets.  Some respondents may be presented with scenarios containing 
unrealistic or irrelevant choice alternatives, relative to the individual’s beliefs, despite these 
being plausible for the average respondent. A tension may thus arise between the efficient design 
of a choice set and respondents’ expectations regarding which kinds of choice alternatives are 
realistic or relevant (Louviere, et al. (2000); Louviere (2006)).  
                                                 
2 For example Adamowicz, et al. (1997) and Poor, et al. (2001) compare WTP estimates from choice models that use 
both objectively measured and subjectively perceived levels of attributes. Experimental economists (e.g. Plott and 
Zeiler (2005)) have examined the role of subjective beliefs in explaining the gap between WTP and willingness to 
accept (WTA).    
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When confronted with unrealistic or irrelevant choice scenarios, respondents may issue 
protest responses.  Outright scenario rejection may lead a respondent to state that they prefer the 
status quo alternative, but they do this for reasons that have nothing to do with their preferences 
or the constraints they face (or they may refuse to make any choice at all). This behavior may 
indicate merely that they doubt the viability of the hypothetical product or proposed program, 
rather than implying that they would not value it if it were guaranteed to work as advertised.3  
When some choices may be protest responses or belie some type of scenario rejection, then, it is 
important to distinguish these from “good” responses (although in practice it can be difficult to 
draw these distinctions).4  Bateman, et al. (2002) suggest several methods to identify these 
protest responses such as follow-up questions about why respondents answered the way they did.  
Strazzera, et al. (2003) also offer possible corrections for selection bias caused by protest zeroes 
in contingent valuation studies.   
Instead of outright scenario rejection, we address the phenomenon of scenario 
adjustment—where respondents find one or more of the attributes of the stated alternatives to be 
somewhat implausible but this problem does not derail the choice process entirely. Instead, the 
individuals may implicitly replace one or more of these implausible stated attributes with 
something that they deem more plausible and then make their decisions based on these mental 
edits to the choice set.  Outright scenario rejection may be difficult enough to detect, but scenario 
adjustment—which is a matter of degree, rather than an all-or-nothing proposition—may be 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed description of protest responses and protest bids, see Bateman, et al. (2002) and Champ, et al. 
(2003).  Rejection of the proposed payment vehicle (e.g. a tax or a user fee) can be another form of protest. 
4 Even in real choice situations, a consumer may choose not to buy a product simply because the seller’s claims 
about it seem “too good to be true.”  If the consumer could verify the product’s qualities, however, they would 
actually make the purchase.  This suggests that scenario rejection (and scenario adjustment) may thus be fairly 
common in real markets, too. 
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more insidious and therefore even more difficult to detect. Debriefing questions asked after 
respondents make the key choice(s) can be invaluable for this purpose.  
SP researchers have long realized the potential for debriefing questions to help them 
understand the perceptions of the respondent during the choice process. A handful of researchers 
have already used specific debriefing questions for detection of scenario adjustment. Carson, et 
al. (1994) ask subjects whether they believed that the pollutants in question could actually cause 
the environmental problems stated in the choice scenario and whether they believed that natural 
processes would return things to normal within the stated number of years.  When respondents 
said they did not believe the stated natural recovery time, they were asked if they thought the true 
recovery time was more or less than the stated time. In a similar vein, Viscusi and Huber (2006) 
ask their respondents for subjective assessments of the probability that the program in question 
will actually produce the advertised benefits.5     
 Researchers should put forth their best effort to make the choice scenarios in a stated 
preference survey as plausible as possible, for as many respondents as possible. Despite these 
best efforts, however, it may be impossible for researchers to fully anticipate the likely 
credibility of all dimensions of a randomized choice scenario from the perspective of every 
individual who might participate in the survey. The best strategy to deal with any residual 
scenario adjustments may be for researchers to anticipate that this behavior is inevitable in some 
proportion of cases and to plan for the option to assess and correct for it.  Our paper illustrates 
how some carefully worded debriefing questions can be used to measure the approximate extent 
of one type of scenario adjustment. Our econometric model controls for these scenario 
adjustments, and counterfactual simulations can then be used to infer what would be the 
                                                 
5 Burghart, et al. (2007) extend a random utility model to include estimated scenario adjustment parameters that 
capture whether respondents appear to believe and/or pay attention to certain key attributes of alternatives in the 
choice set, conditional on the functional form of the choice model. 
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estimated preferences (and hence WTP) had each individual in the sample fully accepted these 
key dimensions of the stated choice scenario. 
3. Available Choice Data 
Since market data from which to infer individuals’ demands for health risk reductions is 
not adequate, Cameron and DeShazo (2009) use stated preference methods to elicit preferences 
for programs to reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality in a general population sample of 
adults in the United States.6  In brief, the survey consists of 5 modules.7  The first module asks 
respondents about their subjective risks of contracting the major illnesses or injuries which are 
the focus of the survey, how lifestyle changes would change their risks of these illnesses, and 
how taxing it would be to implement these lifestyle changes. 
The second module is a tutorial that explains the concept of an “illness profile,” which is 
a sequence of future health states.  An illness profile includes the number of years before the 
individual becomes sick, illness-years while the individual is sick, recovered/post-illness years 
after the individual recovers from the illness, and lost life-years if the individual dies earlier than 
he would have without the disease (or injury).  Then the tutorial informs the individual that he 
might be able to purchase a new, minimally invasive diagnostic program that would reduce his 
risk of experiencing each illness profile.  Each illness-related risk-reduction program consists of 
                                                 
6 Knowledge Networks, Inc administered an internet survey to a sample of 2,439 of their panelists with a response 
rate of 79 percent. 
7 For more information on the survey instrument and the data, see the appendices which accompany Cameron and 
DeShazo (2009): Appendix A – Survey Design & Development, Appendix B – Stated Preference Quality Assurance 
and Quality Control Checks, Appendix C – Details of the Choice Set Design, Appendix D – The Knowledge 
Networks Panel and Sample Selection Corrections, Appendix E – Model, Estimation and Alternative Analyses, and 
Appendix F – Estimating Sample Codebook. 
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a simple finger-prick blood test that would not be covered by the individual’s health insurance 
plan.8 
The third, and key, module of each survey involves a set of five different three-alternative 
conjoint choice experiments where the individual is asked to choose between two possible 
health-risk reducing programs and a status quo alternative. One example of a choice scenario is 
presented in Figure 1.  Each program reduces the risk that the individual will experience a 
specific illness profile for a major illness or injury (i.e. one of five specific types of cancer, heart 
attack, heart disease, stroke, respiratory illness, diabetes, traffic accident or Alzheimer’s disease).  
Each individual-specific illness profile is described to the respondent in terms of the baseline 
probability of experiencing the illness or injury, future age at onset, duration, symptoms and 
treatments, and eventual outcome (recovery or death). The corresponding risk reduction program 
is defined by the expected risk reduction and by its monthly and annual cost. 
Each choice exercise is immediately followed by a set of debriefing questions designed to 
help the researcher understand the individual’s reasons for their particular choice.  Some 
debriefing questions depend on the alternative chosen by the respondent.  For example, there are 
various perfectly legitimate economic reasons why individuals may prefer the status quo—
including that they cannot afford either of the risk-reduction programs which are described, they 
would rather spend money on other things, or they believe they will be affected by another 
illness before they contract either illness stated in the scenario.  If respondents choose the status 
quo, they are asked why “Neither Program” is their preferred alternative.  Included among these 
possible reasons are some that reveal the presence of scenario rejection, such as “I did not 
believe the programs would work.” 
                                                 
8 The cost of the program would cover the test and any indicated medications or treatments to reduce the risk of 
suffering the illness in question. 
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Other debriefing questions are asked regardless of which alternative the individual selects. 
The key question for this paper is shown in Figure 2:  “Around when do you think you would 
begin to value highly the risk reduction benefits of each program?”  We interpret this question as 
being equivalent to the question “When do you think the program’s benefits will start?” The 
benefit of the program is clearly defined on an earlier page of the survey as a reduction in the 
risk of suffering from the specified major illness or injury starting at the age stated in the 
scenario.  If the respondent fully accepts the stated scenario, then the age at which the scenario 
states the benefits start should match the age at which the respondent believes the benefits will 
start. 
Module 4 of the survey contains additional debriefing questions which permit validation 
of other dimensions of the individual’s responses.  Module 5 is collected separately from the 
survey and contains the respondent’s sociodemographic characteristics and a detailed medical 
history, including which major diseases the individual has already faced. 
4. A Random Utility Choice Model 
This paper is based on an empirical specification similar, although not identical, to that 
used in Cameron and DeShazo (2009).  In that paper, it is established that stated choices appear 
to be best predicted by a model that involves expected discounted utility from durations in 
different types of future health states.  Indirect utility is also modeled as additively separable, but 
non-linear, in present discounted expected net income.  If utility is modeled flexibly as a 
quadratic function of net income, the most basic specification is a five-parameter model.9   
                                                 
9 In Cameron and DeShazo (2009), to minimize the dimension of the parameter space, utility is modeled as a 
function of a simple fixed Box-Cox transformation of net income, where the transformation parameter is set at 0.48 
( roughly equivalent to a square root transformation). The remainder of this section consists of an abbreviated 
version of the reasoning described in Cameron and DeShazo (2009) and Appendix E associated with that paper 
(Model, Estimation and Alternative Analyses). 
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To understand the model, consider just the pairwise choice between Program A and the 
status quo alternative (N).10  Define the discount rate as r  and let  1 tt r   .  Let NSi  be the 
probability of individual i  suffering the adverse health profile (i.e. getting “sick”) if the status 
quo alternative (i.e. “neither program”) is selected, and let ASi  be the reduced probability of 
suffering the adverse health profile if Program A is chosen.  The difference between NSi  and  
AS
i  is Ai , which is the risk reduction to be achieved by Program A.  We assume that 
individuals do not expect to pay the annual cost of the risk reduction program if they are sick or 
dead.   
The sequence of health states that makes up an illness profile is captured by a sequence of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive (0, 1) indicator variables associated with each future time 
period t . These are defined as 1( )Aitpre  for pre-illness years, assumed to be equivalent to the 
health state under the status quo alternative.  The sequence of adverse health states for which 
Program A reduces the risk are indicated by 1( )Aitill  for illness-years, 1( )
A
itrcv  for recovered or 
post-illness years, and 1( )Aitlyl  for life-years lost. The present discounted remainder of the 
individual’s nominal life expectancy, iT , is given by 1
iTA t
i t
pdvc  .  Other relevant 
discounted spells, also summed from 1t   to it T  include  1A t Ai itpdve pre  , 
 1A t Ai itpdvi ill  ,  1A t Ai itpdvr rcv  , and  1A t Ai itpdvl lyl  .  Since the different 
health states exhaust the individual’s nominal life expectancy, 
A A A A A
i i i i ipdve pdvi pdvr pdvl pdvc    .  Finally, to accommodate the fact that the individuals 
                                                 
10 There is an analogous choice between Program B and the status quo alternative.  
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expect to pay program costs only during the pre-illness or recovered post-illness periods, we 
define A A Ai i ipdvp pdve pdvr  . 
 To further simplify notation, let  1A AS A AS Ai i i i icterm pdvc pdvp      and let 
A A AS A NS A
i i i i i iyterm pdvc pdvi pdvl      .  Adapting the model in Cameron and DeShazo 
(2009),  the expected utility-difference that drives the individual’s choice between Program A 
and the status quo can then be specified as: 
 
    
  
     
, 0
2 2
1
1 2 3
                               
        + +
A A A A
S H i i i i i i
A A A
i i i i i
AS A AS A AS A A
i i i i i i i
E PDV V Y c cterm Y yterm
Y c cterm Y yterm
pdvi pdvr pdvl


   
     
  
    
 (1) 
Where 0  and 1  are the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms in net income in the 
underlying indirect utility function. The five terms in braces can be constructed from the data, 
given specific assumptions about the discount rate.11  In our tables of results, the constructed 
variables in the first two sets of braces, modified by the coefficients 0  and 1 , will be 
referenced simply as “first income term” and “second income term.” 
 In the sense of Graham (1981), the “option price” for Program A is defined as the 
maximum common certain payment that makes the individual just indifferent between paying for 
the program and enjoying the risk reduction, or not paying for the program and not enjoying the 
risk reduction.  The annual option price ˆAic  that makes the expression in equation (1) exactly 
equal to zero can be calculated as  
   0 11 0 1ˆ
A A A
i i i iA
i i A
i i
Y yterm pterm
c Y f
Y cterm
  
 
          
 (2) 
                                                 
11 In this paper, we assume a common discount rate of 5%.  In Cameron and DeShazo (2009), the consequences of 
assuming either a 3% discount rate or a 7% discount rate are explored.   
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Where   20 1 0 1( ) i i i if Y Y Y Y Y       , so that  1f    is the solution to a quadratic form.  
Then, the expected present value of this stream of payments must be calculated over the 
individual’s remaining nominal lifespan: 
  , ˆ ˆA A AS H i i iE PV c cterm c        (3) 
Finally, to convert this expected present-value option price into a measure that Cameron and 
DeShazo (2009) call the “willingness to pay for a microrisk reduction” ( rWTP ), we normalize 
arbitrarily on a 610  risk change by dividing this WTP by the absolute size of the risk reduction 
and dividing by one million to produce: 
   6, ˆ 10A Ar S H i iWTP E PV c       (4) 
The rWTP depends upon the entire illness profile and all of the parameters in equation (1).  The 
value of one million microrisk reductions is the closest counterpart, in this model, to the 
conventional idea of the “value of a statistical life” (VSL) employed in the mortality risk 
valuation literature, as discussed (for example) in the meta-analysis by Viscusi and Aldy (2003).  
This normalized rWTP can be used to compare the relative magnitudes of willingness to pay for 
health risk reductions for differing age groups and illness profiles.12     
 Cameron and DeShazo (2009) determine, however, that the simple five-parameter model 
in equation (1) is dominated by a specification that is not merely linear in the terms involving 
present discounted health-state years.  First, we factor out the probability differences in the final 
terms in equation (1) as: 
                                                 
12 For readers who may be less familiar with the literature on VSLs, we emphasize that a VSL is definitely not a 
measure of willingness to pay to avoid empirically relevant sizes of risk reductions, such as the modest reductions in 
already-small risks, achieved by most environmental, health, or safety regulations.  The typical risk reduction is 
vastly smaller than the 1.00 risk reduction used for the conventional normalization behind a VSL estimate. 
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     1 2 3
1 2 3
+ +
     
AS A AS A AS A
i i i i i i
AS A A A
i i i i
pdvi pdvr pdvl
pdvi pdvr pdvl
  
  
  
     
 
This simple linear specification does not explain respondents’ observed choices as successfully 
as a model that employs shifted logarithms of the jipdvX  terms (where , ,X i r l .).  A form that 
is fully translog (including all squares and pairwise interaction terms for the three log terms) has 
been considered, and two of the higher-order terms bear statistically significant coefficients.  If 
we retain only those terms for which the coefficients are statistically different from zero, this 
final term becomes: 
 
     
       
1 2 3
2
4 5
log 1 log 1 log 1
log 1 log 1 log 1
A A A
i i i
AS
i A A A
i i i
pdvi pdvr pdvl
pdvl pdvi pdvl
  
 
              
 (5) 
The opportunity for longer durations in each health state is correlated with the youth of 
the respondent. Thus, it is also important to allow the   coefficients to differ systematically with 
the respondent’s current age wherever this generalization is warranted by the data.  This leads to 
a model where 23 30 31 31i iage age      , and analogously for 4  and 5 .   This quadratic-in-
age systematic variation in parameters permits non-constant age profiles for the rWTP estimates 
from this model, and the data tend to produce the usual higher values during middle age and 
lower values for younger and older respondents.13 
   
                                                 
13 One final additional parameter is featured in these models.  It accommodates a correction for sample 
representativeness.  Cameron and DeShazo (2009), in Appendix D, estimate the determinants of membership in the 
estimating sample, relative to the original half-million general population panel recruitment contacts by Knowledge 
Networks, Inc. These models permit construction of fitted response probabilities for each consumer in the estimating 
sample.  These response probabilities can be expressed as deviations from the central tendency in response 
probabilities across the recruitment pool.  Only the coefficient on the term in discounted illness-years is shifted to a 
statistically significant extent when the subject’s response probability deviates from the average.  Thus the model 
includes a shift variable on that coefficient by employing the interaction term    log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi        . 
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5.  Controlling for Scenario Adjustment with Respect to Latency 
Recall that after each choice scenario, respondents are asked debriefing questions about when 
they believe that the benefits of each proposed program would begin—for them personally. 
Based on the answers to each of the questions in Figure 2, we define two variables. First, 
1( )jinever  is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the individual responds by checking 
“Never (Program would not benefit me).” Our second variable,  jioverest , is an approximately 
continuous variable defined as the “minimum overestimate of the latency,” which measures the 
disparity between the individual’s subjective latency and the latency stated in the choice scenario 
on the survey.  
 The variable jioverest  requires a more detailed explanation.  If the interval checked in the 
question in Figure 2 contains the stated latency for the illness from the corresponding choice 
scenario, then jioverest  = 0. The relationship between the chosen interval and the stated latency 
is thus something like that shown in Part A of Figure 3. In this case, the time when benefits begin 
(in the opinion of the respondent) is essentially the same as the latency stated in the choice 
scenario. In contrast, jioverest  has a positive value equal to the difference between the lower 
bound of the checked time interval and the stated latency if that checked interval lies entirely 
above the stated latency for that illness in the choice scenario, like the outcome shown in Part B 
of Figure 3. jioverest  has a negative value equal to the difference between the upper bound of the 
checked interval if the checked interval lies entirely below the stated latency, as illustrated in 
Part C of Figure 3.14  
                                                 
14 In Appendix A to this paper, available from the authors, we explore the relationships between each of our two 
scenario adjustment variables and an array of explanatory variables specific either to the individual or to the choice 
scenario. In the body of the paper, however, we use the observed values of these variables, rather than fitted values. 
Many respondent characteristics contribute significantly to explaining variation in these two variables, but as can be 
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The usual intent within a stated preference study is to induce individuals to accept the 
stated choice scenario as fully as possible and for them to respond conditional on that acceptance.  
If respondents selectively reinterpret the question (i.e. adjust the choice scenario) before they 
answer, then this violates an important maintained hypothesis behind the random utility model 
that produces the utility parameter estimates which are the foundation of most stated preference 
studies.  We thus use the “observed” values of 1( )jinever  and 
j
ioverest  constructed from the 
debriefing questions associated with each of the 15,040 illness profiles presented to our 
respondents to control and correct for scenario adjustment with respect to the latency attribute.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in these models are presented in Table 1. 
We accommodate scenario adjustment by allowing each of the utility parameters in our 
baseline model to differ systematically with individuals’ responses to the debriefing questions 
about whether and when the benefits from each health-risk reduction program are likely to be 
realized.  The working version of the model without scenario adjustments involves a total of 
fourteen parameters— 0  and 1  which capture the marginal utility of net income (i.e. 
expenditure on all other goods and services), the five basic   parameters ( 10 20 30 40 50, , , ,     ) 
appearing in the illness profile term in expression (5) above, plus the three pairs of coefficients 
on the iage  and 
2
iage  terms that shift 3 , 4  and 5 , and the single coefficient, 13 , on the 
interaction term between the fitted sample participation probability and the sick-years term.  
To effect corrections for scenario adjustment, our two scenario adjustment variables, 
1( )jinever  and 
j
ioverest , are initially allowed to shift every one of these fourteen utility 
                                                                                                                                                             
seen from the R-squared values for these fitted models, it is difficult to predict accurately either of the two scenario 
adjustment variables based solely on observed characteristics of each individual.  
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parameters.  If we represent each of these parameters generically as  , the new model substitutes 
a systematically varying parameter as follows: 15 
0 1 21( )
j j
i inever overest          (2) 
for a total of 52 parameters in the fully generalized specification.16  In Table 2, however, we 
report results for a parsimonious version that retains only those shift variables which are 
individually statistically significant.17 
 Model 1 in Table 2 gives the utility parameter estimates which result when the possibility 
of scenario adjustment is completely ignored during estimation. Model 2 in the same table 
(which actually spans columns 2 through 4) reveals the results when scenario adjustment is 
accommodated.  The ideal situation (i.e. full acceptance of the stated latency of benefits) 
corresponds to 1( ) 0jinever   and 0jioverest   for all respondents and all programs.  We thus 
label the first column of parameters for Model 2 as “Corrected,” since these are the estimated 
utility parameters which would apply when 1( )jinever  and 
j
ioverest  are both set equal to zero—
i.e. when we simulate counterfactually the latency scenarios that the survey had intended each 
respondent to accept.   
 In Model 2, where we measure and correct for scenario adjustment, the magnitudes of 
some of the shift parameters are striking.  The second column of results for Model 2 shows the 
significant shifts in each of these utility parameters when the respondent states that they will 
                                                 
15 In a set of preliminary models, we employed both 1( )jinever  and a pair of indicator variables for over- or 
underestimation (relative to none) to shift each of the   parameters in the general model. The results were 
qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
16 Results for these fully generalized 52-parameter models are contained in Appendix B, available from the authors. 
17 We acknowledge that these variables may be, to some extent, jointly endogenous with the underlying willingness 
to pay for health risk reductions because they are reported by the same individuals. In Appendix A, available from 
the authors, we note that despite the considerable number of statistically significant coefficients in our models to 
explain jioverest , we are only able to explain (at best) about 35% of its variation across illness profiles using the 
large number of explanatory variables we have available.  
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never benefit from the program in question.  The third column shows the significant shifts in 
these parameters for a one-unit increase in jioverest . 
The marginal utility of income from Model 2 serves as the denominator in the marginal 
rate of substitution (between each illness profile attribute and income) that gives the estimated 
marginal willingness to pay associated with each attribute.  Overestimation of the latency 
appears to be associated with a higher estimated marginal utility of income, which means a lower 
WTP.  The perception that a particular program will never benefit the respondent also appears to 
undo the evidence for a diminishing marginal utility of income.  For these cases, WTP is no 
longer greater at higher incomes, whereas this appears to be the case when respondents fully 
accept the stated latencies.  
There are also a number of important differences for “scenario adjusters” among the 
coefficients on the illness profile terms. In two cases (for the linear term in the shifted log of 
discounted sick years, and for the interaction term between the shifted logs of discounted sick-
years and discounted lost life-years), the discrete shift in the parameter associated with the 
perception that the program will never provide any benefit is sufficient to completely change the 
sign of the effect.  In two other cases, the sign of the coefficient remains the same but the 
coefficient more than doubles in size. Whenever the coefficients on the interaction terms 
involving jioverest  are statistically significant, they bear a sign that is opposite to the baseline 
coefficient on the same term. Scenario adjustments can thus have a clearly discernible impact 
upon estimated marginal utilities. 
The magnitudes of the shift parameters reported for Model 2 in Table 2 appear fairly 
large, but to appreciate the overall effects of these parameter changes on demand estimates, it is 
necessary to simulate distributions for the implied (normalized) willingness-to-pay estimates. 
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Bear in mind that the U.S. EPA, for example, relies upon an overall average value of a statistical 
life (a VSL associated with sudden death in the current period) of about $6-$7 million, whereas 
for transportation policies, the VSL numbers typically used have historically been closer to $3-$4 
million, although they have been revised upward somewhat in recent years.  In Table 3, we show 
selected rWTP estimates for specified individuals and conditions. We consider, in succession, an 
individual who is 30, 45, or 60 years old.  In all cases, the individual earns an income of $42,000 
per year. The illness profiles involve shorter (and longer) illnesses with “recovery,” shorter (and 
longer) illnesses followed by death, and sudden death with no preceding period of illness. The 
“sudden death” rWTP estimates, when multiplied by one million, are most comparable to 
conventional VSL estimates.18   
Scenario adjustment in this illustration concerns illness latency, so two different latency 
periods are considered.  In the first pair of columns in Table 3, we specify that each illness 
commences immediately (i.e. with no latency period).  In the second pair, we specify a latency 
period of twenty years.  In each pair of columns, the initial uncorrected rWTP  estimates are 
calculated from the uncorrected parameters of Model 1 in Table 2.  The corrected rWTP  
numbers are calculated using the baseline coefficients from Model 2 in Table 2, which have been 
corrected for any scenario adjustments reported by respondents.   
 Table 3 shows that for the “No Latency” illness profiles, the corrected rWTP estimates 
are mostly higher than those produced by the model that does not take scenario adjustment into 
account. The most dramatic differences are for longer and fatal illnesses for 60-year-olds, where 
                                                 
18 The illnesses described in our choice scenarios are all major illnesses, including most of the ailments from which 
people eventually die.  It is clear from our analysis that people do not assume that their health status “after” one of 
these illnesses, should they recover, will be equivalent to their pre-illness state.  Thus the value of avoiding a one-
year major illness includes the value of avoiding the ensuing post-illness health state.  It will not be the same as the 
value of avoiding just that year of illness, separate from any ensuing years in an incompletely recovered state. 
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the uncorrected model suggests a rWTP  of less than $1, whereas the corrected estimate is $6.93.  
The only exceptions (where the corrected estimates are lower than the uncorrected estimates) are 
for some of the illnesses which are not fatal.  The difference in the corrected and uncorrected 
rWTP  estimates suggests that if scenario adjustment is not taken into account, willingness to 
pay estimates for many illness profiles of this type may be biased downward.  This type of bias 
may result in the recommendation that some programs or policies that reduce illnesses and 
injuries with no latency (i.e. where benefits start immediately) should not be implemented when 
it may actually be welfare-increasing to put these measures into effect.   
 In contrast, the corrected estimates for illness profiles that have a latency of 20 years are 
almost all lower than the uncorrected estimates.  The 90% simulated distributions for these 
rWTP measures often include zero. The only two anomalies, where the corrected estimates are 
higher, are for the non-fatal illness profiles for 30-year-olds.  This suggests that failure to take 
into account scenario adjustment could cause some programs or policies that address long-
latency health risks to be implemented when they are not actually welfare-enhancing from the 
current perspective of most age groups. These differences in the corrected and uncorrected 
rWTP  estimates show how important it may be to acknowledge and correct for scenario 
adjustments in stated preference research.    
6. Conclusions 
 
The absence of suitable market data sometimes forces researchers to use stated preference 
methods to assess demand for fundamentally non-market (or pre-test-market) goods or services. 
Given economists’ skepticism about the reliability of stated preference data, researchers in fields 
where adequate market data tend to be scarce have systematically addressed many recognized 
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problems with these alternative demand-measurement methodologies. One problem with SP 
research has been the occurrence of protest responses or scenario rejection, where respondents 
completely refuse to play along with the hypothetical choice exercise because they do not believe 
(or agree with) some aspect of the choice scenario. This paper addresses the related but 
potentially more subtle problem of scenario adjustment. Respondents do make the stated choices 
requested of them, but they first implicitly revise the choice scenario to better capture what 
would be the implications of each alternative in their own particular case. 
Scenario adjustment may be more likely in situations where the alternatives involved in 
the choice problem are less easy to perceive and appreciate. For example, it may be possible to 
describe, unambiguously, the relevant attributes of alternative brands of dishwashing soap, in 
which case scenario adjustment would be unlikely.  In contrast, it may be very difficult to 
completely describe the relevant attributes of a program to enhance the survival of an endangered 
species, where even the experts cannot predict for certain whether the program will be effective. 
Choices that involve heterogeneous risks or uncertain outcomes, such as the reduction of health 
risks, may be the most vulnerable to scenario adjustment, since there is great variability in how 
different people perceive risks and uncertainty.  
Assessment and correction for scenario adjustment is easier and can be more systematic 
if suitable debriefing questions about each key choice scenario are posed in the survey. The 
specific debriefing question used in our empirical illustration in this paper is very useful, but it 
may still have been less than ideal.  Carefully planned questions of this type, however, can help 
the researcher identify those individuals who acknowledge that they do not believe that the 
preceding choice scenario, exactly as stated, applies to them.  Where possible, debriefing 
questions can also be used to quantify the likely extent to which individuals may have adjusted 
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the scenario. With information about the extent of scenario adjustments, researchers can 
explicitly model the effects of scenario adjustment on the estimated utility parameters in their 
choice models. This allows counterfactual simulations of the individual’s most likely response, 
had they answered the question exactly as it was asked.  These types of simulations, with 
systematic correction for scenario adjustment, presumably permit more accurate estimates of 
demand.  
The data used in this study suggest that some individuals may indeed update some 
aspects of choice scenarios so that these scenarios better apply to their own personal situations. 
We use an empirical choice model that allows our utility parameter estimates to differ 
systematically according to the respondent’s own reports of possible scenario adjustment with 
respect to latency periods. Our estimation results show that our counterfactually simulated WTP-
type benefits estimates—corrected for scenario adjustment—are often noticeably different from 
the uncorrected estimates.  For example, our empirical estimates suggest that after correction for 
scenario adjustments, programs that benefit people now have mainly higher estimates, while 
programs that benefit people twenty years into the future have mainly lower estimates.  These 
differences in estimated demands are big enough that they could potentially make the difference 
between enacting a policy that is warranted on a benefit-cost criterion and failing to enact it.   
Given our findings and the differences in demand estimates (with and without correction) 
in this illustration, we infer that scenario adjustment is likely to be inevitable and potentially 
influential, in at least some proportion of cases, in many other applications as well. Debriefing 
questions to permit assessment and correction of scenario adjustment should probably be a 
regular feature of SP surveys. Likewise, formal modeling of scenario adjustment and its impact 
on the final estimates of interest should probably be a routine component of sensitivity analysis 
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in empirical work using stated preferences.  Researchers should at least report the extent to 
which their main results may be affected by this type of correction. Such information would 
allow the policy-makers to decide which types of “misalignments” between respondent and 
researcher information sets warrant correction, and therefore which demand estimates should be 
preferred.
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Figure 1 – One Example of a Randomized Choice Scenario19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 A table like this one is displayed only after 24 screens of preparation, including an extensive tutorial that unfolds 
the information in each row of the summary choice table, one attribute at a time. The tutorial includes instructions 
about how to interpret the information and skill-testing questions to assess the respondent’s understanding of key 
points.  The tutorial makes use of the same data that will appear in the individual’s first choice set. Subsequent 
choice sets are presented as summary tables only. 
Choose the program that reduces the illness that you most want to 
avoid.  But think carefully about whether the costs are too high for 
you.  If both programs are too expensive, then choose Neither 
Program. 
 
If you choose “neither program”, remember that you could die early 
from a number of causes, including the ones described below. 
 Program A for Diabetes 
Program B 
for Heart Attack 
Symptoms/ 
Treatment 
Get sick when 77 years-old 
6 weeks of hospitalization 
No surgery 
Moderate pain for 7 years 
 
Get sick when 67 years-old 
No hospitalization 
No surgery 
Severe pain for a few hours 
 
Recovery/ 
Life expectancy 
Do not recover 
Die at 84 instead of 88 
 
Do not recover 
Die suddenly at 67 instead of 88 
 
Risk Reduction 
10% 
From 10 in 1,000 to 9 in 1,000 
 
10% 
From 40 in 1,000 to 36 in 1,000 
 
Costs to you 
$12 per month 
[ = $144 per year] 
 
$17 per month 
[ = $204 per year] 
 
Your choice 
 
Reduce my 
chance of  
diabetes 
Reduce my 
chance of 
heart attack 
 Neither 
Program 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Example of Debriefing Questions Used to Correct for Scenario Adjustment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
You may have chosen Program A, Program B, or neither. Regardless of 
your choice, we would like to know when, over your lifetime, you think you 
would first need and benefit from the two programs (if at all).  
Your answers below may depend upon the illness or injury in question, as 
well as your current age, health and family history.  
Around when do you think you would begin to value highly the risk 
reduction benefits of each program?  
Select one answer from each column in the grid 
 Program A  
to reduce my chance of 
diabetes 
Program B  
to reduce my chance of 
heart attack 
For me, benefits would start   
Immediately   
1-5 years from now   
6-10 years from now   
11-20 years from now   
21-30 years from now   
31 or more years from now   
Never (Program would not 
benefit me)   
 3
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Examples of “Minimum Overestimate of the Latency” Calculations; Different stated 
latencies, but respondent chooses “11-20 years” in the debriefing question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics – Policy Choice Models 
(n = 15040 illness profiles and associated risk reduction programs) 
 Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
Program attributes     
  Monthly program cost ($) 29.9 28.7 2 140 
  ji = Risk change achieved by program -.00341 .00167 -.006 -.001 
Stated Illness profiles     
  Latency (in years, stated in scenario) 19.6 12.0 1 60 
  -  1( )jinever  (“Program will never benefit me”) .0769    
  -  jioverest  (minimum overest. of latency) -7.47 12.0 -59 29 
  Sick years (undiscounted) 6.50 7.17 0 52 
     jipdvi = Present value of sick-years 2.21 2.51 0 16.3 
  Recovered years (undiscounted) 26.1 13.0 0 64 
     jipdvr = Present value of recovered years .477 1.37 0 15.9 
  Lost life-years (undiscounted) 10.8 10.3 0 55 
     jipdvl = Present value of lost life-years 2.57 2.93 0 17.8 
Attributes of individuals     
  Annual income (in $10,000) 5.09 3.41 0.5 15.0 
  Age at time of choice 50.4 15.1 25 93 
Systematic selection from RDD contacts     
  
^ ^
( )iP sel P = Difference between fitted 
response/nonresponse and population average 
.677 3.36 -.316 17.9 
Table 2: Policy Choice Model (Parsimonious; alternatives = 22560) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Parameter) Variable 
Uncorrected 
Coefficients
Corrected 
Coefficients 1( )
j
inever   jioverest  
  50 10 first income term   5.183 8.071 - 0.225 
(8.30)*** (10.69)***  (5.14)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -.1992 -.2109 .7656 - 
(4.22)*** (4.15)*** (3.05)***  
   10 log 1AS Ai ipdvi    -47.89 -57.32 212.7 7.083 
(5.35)*** (5.04)*** (3.91)*** (7.24)*** 
        13 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi         3.372 3.853 - - (2.34)** (2.45)**   
   2 log 1AS Ai ipdvr    -16.49 -57.93 - - 
(1.76)* (5.77)***   
   30 log 1AS Ai ipdvl    -580.1 -858.3 - 4.092 
(3.25)*** (4.28)***  (3.26)*** 
         31 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl    20.46 43.15 - - 
(2.82)*** (5.41)***   
         232 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl    -0.1874 -0.3719 - 0.0064 
(2.70)*** (4.97)***  (7.39)*** 
    240 log 1AS Ai ipdvl      199.3 281.8 395.6 - (2.41)** (3.11)*** (4.51)***  
          241 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl      -7.786 -15.71 -5.197 - (2.32)** (4.31)*** (3.69)***  
          2242 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl      0.0739 0.1365 - -0.0013 (2.27)** (3.90)***  (3.12)*** 
   
 
50 log 1
               log 1
AS A
i i
A
i
pdvi
pdvl
    
   
 
102.4 129.6 -348.0 -4.301 
(1.40) (1.62) (3.77)*** (3.90)*** 
      
   
 
51 0 log 1
                          log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
    
   
 
-4.484 -6.680 - - 
(1.57) (2.16)**   
      
   
 
2
52 0 log 1
                          log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
    
   
 
0.0561 0.0624 0.0752 - 
(2.10)** (2.17)** (3.28)***  
Log L -11694.646 -10954.934 
a Corrected utility parameters are purged of scenario adjustment as captured by systematic differences in these parameters 
for alternatives where stated latency was not accepted by the respondent. 
Table 3:  Willingness to pay for a microrisk reduction (mean [5th, 95th percentiles]a)  
Without and with correction for illness scenario adjustment (Income = $42,000) 
  No latencyb Latency of 20 yrs 
Age Illness profile Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
30 1 year sick, recover $ 2.49 
[1.3,3.94] 
$ 3.20 
[2.43,4.07] 
$ 1.54 
[0.77,2.49] 
$ 1.94 
[1.43,2.50] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.75 
[2.59,5.16] 
3.94 
[3.13,4.86] 
2.32 
[1.60,3.20] 
2.35 
[1.87,2.90] 
 1 year sick, then die 4.14 
[1.67,6.80] 
6.52 
[4.89,8.40] 
4.42 
[3.26,5.97] 
1.67 
[0.97,2.42] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 4.19 
[1.39,7.21] 
7.02 
[5.05,9.12] 
4.57 
[3.51,6.00] 
1.99 
[1.42,2.65] 
 Sudden death 4.26 
[1.30,7.38] 
5.74 
[3.96,7.64] 
4.35 
[2.97,6.04] 
1.42 
[0.55,2.28] 
45 1 year sick, recover 2.33 
[1.20,3.75] 
2.68 
[1.93,3.48] 
1.33 
[0.64,2.15] 
1.27 
[0.82,1.72] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.56 
[2.45,4.92] 
3.47 
[2.73,4.33] 
2.08 
[1.44,2.84] 
1.68 
[1.29,2.12] 
 1 year sick, then die 4.59 
[2.99,6.55] 
7.61 
[6.39,9.09] 
2.53 
[1.95,3.21] 
-0.93 c 
[-1.59,-0.37] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 4.44 
[2.73,6.66] 
8.48 
[7.04,10.14] 
2.66 
[2.16,3.32] 
-0.39 c 
[-0.89,0.04] 
 Sudden death 4.57 
[2.88,6.58] 
6.10 
[4.88,7.39] 
2.43 
[1.71,3.19] 
-1.37 c 
[-2.15,-0.70] 
60 1 year sick, recover 2.21 
[1.07,3.46] 
2.04 
[1.31,2.75] 
1.11 
[0.55,1.67] 
0.30 
[-0.08,0.63] 
 5 yrs sick, recover 3.26 
[2.19,4.5] 
2.86 
[2.19,3.62] 
1.66 
[1.22,2.11] 
0.59 
[0.27,0.87] 
 1 year sick, then die 2.40 
[0.98,4.03] 
6.41 
[5.26,7.82] 
1.27 
[0.57,1.91] 
-2.76 c 
[-3.79,-1.97] 
 5 yrs sick, then die 0.92 b 
[-0.6,2.58] 
6.93 
[5.65,8.48] 
1.23 
[0.67,1.78] 
-1.85 c 
[-2.63,-1.27] 
 Sudden death 3.46 
[1.88,5.13] 
4.97 
[3.83,6.18] 
1.39 
[0.52,2.09] 
-3.20 c 
[-4.32,-2.33] 
a Based on random draws from the joint distribution of the estimated parameters. 
b Zero latency was implausible to respondents in the illness profiles used to elicit program choices, so the 
minimum latency in the choice scenarios was 1 year.  These values are thus extrapolated, based upon the 
fitted model.   
c Respondents were given no opportunity to express negative willingness to pay, so negative simulated 
values should be interpreted as zero WTP.
 
APPENDIX A (to be made available online) 
In this Appendix, we carefully consider the empirical correlates of our two scenario 
adjustment indicators. Table A-1 gives descriptive statistics for these variables and a set of 
regressors we used to explain systematic variations in their magnitudes.  First, we use a simple 
binary logit model to examine how the value of the indicator variable 1( )jinever can be explained 
by a wide variety of (a) characteristics of the respondent, and (b) attributes of the health risk 
targeted by each program. Each respondent considers ten different health risk-reduction 
programs, in five sets of two, with each choice set including the status quo as a third alternative.  
In total, therefore, 15,040 substantive illness profiles and health-risk reduction programs are 
considered in the 7,520 choice scenarios analyzed in this paper.  For 1,156 (7.69%) of these 
illness profiles, respondents indicated their belief that they would never benefit from the risk-
reduction program.  
Models 1 and 2 in Table A-2 are ad hoc binary logit models to explain these 7.69% of 
cases where 1( )jinever =1. Missing data for some of the explanatory variables used in these 
preliminary exploratory models accounts for the reduction of the number of illness profiles from 
15,040 to 13,626. The logit specification suggests that people are more likely to say that a 
particular program will never benefit them if they are female, if they currently have a larger 
number of other illnesses, if they feel at greater subjective risk for getting other illnesses, if they 
are a member of a larger household, or if they are a single parent.  People are less likely to say 
the program will never benefit them if they are presented with an illness profile that includes 
long-term pain and/or disability, if they have not attended college, if they acknowledge a higher 
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subjective risk of getting this disease, if they have (on average) more room to improve their 
health habits, and if they currently have children in their household. 
Now we explore the determinants of our approximately continuous measure of the 
“minimum overestimate of the latency,” in this case using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model.  
The jioverest  for a program is known only if the individual does not state that they expect never 
to benefit from the program (i.e. if 1( ) 0jinever  ).  Thus, we have a maximum of 15,040 – 1,156 
= 13,884 potential observations on the jioverest  variable.  For many respondents and many 
programs, the interval during which the individual personally expects the benefits of the program 
to begin spans the onset time specified in the illness profile.  For these individuals and programs,
0jioverest  , signaling minimal scenario adjustment with respect to the latency period.  This 
happens for 4,133 of the 13,884 programs for which jioverest  information is available.  Latency 
is overestimated to some degree for 1,542 programs, and underestimated for 8,209 programs.  
The mean value of jioverest  is -7.57 (with a minimum of -59 and a maximum of 29).
20  
Models 1 through 5 in Table A-3 demonstrate the significant determinants of jioverest  
across a variety of alternative specifications. Missing data for some of the regressors again 
reduces the estimating sample, this time from 13,884 to 12,596 illness profiles. The coefficients 
on age and age-squared are highly significant in the first two models when latency variables for 
the specified illness profiles are left out of the model.  When latency variables are included (as in 
Models 3 through 5), the coefficients on the age variables are no longer statistically significant.  
                                                 
20 The scenario adjustment data with respect to latency thus suggests that underestimation predominates. 
This may reflect opinions that acute cases of major illness do not typically come as a complete surprise.  They often 
occur after years of decline in the individual’s general level of health. 
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It is likely that latency effects are captured by the age variables in the first two models. The 
insignificant age terms are dropped from the specification in Model 4.  
Model 5 demonstrates the consequences of using an interval-data model rather than 
treating jioverest  as an approximately continuous variable. As is clear from in Figure 2, 
respondents were asked to specify the future time interval when their benefits would start, and 
Model 5 more explicitly captures the interval nature of these data. However, the estimates 
produced by Models 4 and 5 are very similar.  The only notable difference is that the estimated 
coefficient on the respondent’s subjective risk of suffering other illnesses becomes statistically 
insignificant in Model 5 (although the point estimate remains similar). 
Models 4 and 5 suggest that individuals are more likely to overestimate the latency period 
when they consider an illness profile with a longer period of pain or disability, if the illness 
profile has pain/disability lasting more than 60 months, if they feel at greater subjective risk for 
other illnesses, if they belong to a two-income household, or if they will have a child under the 
age of eighteen in the household at the time of the stated onset of the disease. Individuals are 
more likely to assume that the latency in their own case will be less than the stated latency in the 
survey if they have not attended college, if they already have the illness in question, if they have 
a larger number of other major illnesses, if they feel at a higher subjective risk for this illness, if 
they have (on average) more room to improve their health habits, or if they have children or are 
single parents.  The length of the latency period stated in the illness profile is also an important 
determinant of jioverest .  Not surprisingly, a longer stated latency period in the scenario makes 
respondents more likely to underestimate the latency and vice versa. 
 
Table A-1:  Descriptive Statistics for Correlates of Scenario Adjustment Variables 
      Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
 Will never benefit from program*   1 jinever  0.077    
 Minimum overestimate of latency** 
j
ioverest  -8.12 12.3 -58 29 
 Minimum overestimate if latency overestimated 
j
ioverest  > 0  7.72 6.45 1 29 
 Minimum overestimate if latency underestimated 
j
ioverest  < 0 -15.2 10.8 -58 -1 
Attributes of stated illness profile     
 Duration of pain/disability (months if less than 60) 35.8 38.0 0 192 
 1(Longterm pain/disability) (>60 months) 0.288 0.453   
Age/gender/income of respondent     
 Age of respondent (years) 49.9 14.9 25 93 
 1(Female) 0.504    
 Income ($10,000) 5.18 3.38 0.5 15.0 
Educational attainment     
 1(Less than HS) 0.104 0.305   
 1(High School) 0.337 0.473   
 1(Some College) 0.251 0.433   
Objective health status     
 1(Have same illness) 0.040 0.195   
 Count of other major illness 0.294 0.578   
Subjective health risks     
 Subjective risk, same illness -0.223 1.24   
 Subjective risk, other illness -0.242 0.861   
 Avg room to improve health habits 3.446 0.831   
Respondent’s household structure     
 Size of household 2.57 1.26   
 1(Have kids) 0.287 0.452   
 1(Single parent) 0.017 0.129   
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.647 0.478   
 1(Have kid at onset) 0.029 0.169   
 1(Single parent & kid at onset) 0.001 0.030   
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) 0.023 0.150   
* To conserve space, descriptive statistics are based on illness profiles with complete data for the model to explain 
overest  (i.e. 12,596 observations).  Proportion for variable 1(never) is displayed for the 13,626 illness profiles with 
complete data when this is the dependent variable. 
** 29.3% of the minimum overestimate of latency (overest) observations are equal to zero. Note that overest = 0 if the 
respondent’s subjective latency interval contains the latency stated in the survey. 
Table A-2:  Models to explain “Never (Program would not benefit me)” 
  
1 - Binary Logit
1( )jinever  
2 - Binary Logit
1( )jinever  
Attributes of illness profile   
 Duration of pain/disability (months if less than 60) 0.001 0.000 
  (0.57) (0.50) 
 1(Longterm pain/disability >60 months) -0.157 -0.155 
  (1.97)** (1.95)* 
Some demographic characteristics of respondents   
 Age of respondent (years) -0.006 - 
  (0.45)  
 Age2/100 0.010 - 
  (0.79)  
 1(Female) 0.375 0.381 
  (5.61)*** (5.71)*** 
Educational attainment   
 1(Less than HS) -0.254 -0.213 
  (2.09)** (1.77)* 
 1(High School) -0.274 -0.246 
  (3.27)*** (2.98)*** 
 1(Some College) -0.143 -0.136 
  (1.64) (1.57) 
Objective health status   
 1(Have same illness) 0.187 0.222 
  (0.99) (1.18) 
 Count of other major illness 0.116 0.146 
  (1.99)** (2.61)*** 
Subjective health risks   
 Subjective risk, same illness -0.342 -0.343 
  (10.15)*** (10.20)*** 
 Subjective risk, other illness 0.152 0.147 
  (3.23)*** (3.12)*** 
 Avg room to improve health habits -0.081 -0.094 
  (2.01)** (2.36)** 
Respondent’s household structure   
 Size of household 0.144 0.140 
  (3.54)*** (3.70)*** 
 1(Have kids) -0.167 -0.219 
  (1.42) (1.96)* 
 1(Single parent) 0.578 0.564 
  (2.48)** (2.48)** 
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.017 - 
  (0.22)  
 1(Have kid at onset) 0.064 - 
  (0.16)  
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -0.173 - 
  (0.37)  
 Constant -2.720 -2.708 
   (6.85)*** (15.76)*** 
Observations 13626 13626 
Log L -3550.8 -3552.8 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Table A-3:  Models to explain Minimum Over-Estimate of Latency (overest) 
  
  1 - OLS 
j
ioverest  
2 - OLS 
j
ioverest  
3 – OLS 
Latency 
j
ioverest  
4 –OLS 
Latency 
j
ioverest  
5 – OLS 
(Interval )* 
j
ioverest  
Attributes of illness profile      
 Pain/disability (months if <60) 0.033 0.033 0.012 0.011 0.011 
  (11.38)*** (11.37)*** (4.65)*** (4.31)*** (4.15)*** 
 1(pain/disability) (>60 months) 0.502 0.499 0.578 0.574 0.578 
  (2.07)** (2.06)** (2.76)*** (2.74)*** (2.61)*** 
Some demographic characteristics of respondents   
 Age of respondent (years) 0.314 0.311 0.012 - - 
  (6.92)*** (6.87)*** (0.15)   
 Age-squared (100s of years) -0.116 -0.113 -0.078 - - 
  (2.70)*** (2.64)*** (1.10)   
 1(Female) -0.205 - - - - 
  (0.99)     
Educational attainment      
 1(Less than HS) -1.832 -1.876 -1.712 -1.813 -1.949 
  (4.79)*** (4.93)*** (5.21)*** (5.52)*** (5.64)*** 
 1(High School) -0.673 -0.701 -0.559 -0.587 -0.516 
  (2.56)** (2.68)*** (2.47)** (2.59)*** (2.15)** 
 1(Some College) -0.239 -0.256 -0.375 -0.365 -0.405 
  (0.86) (0.92) (1.56) (1.52) (1.59) 
Objective health status      
 1(Have same illness) -2.554 -2.542 -2.125 -2.181 -2.118 
  (4.70)*** (4.67)*** (4.52)*** (4.64)*** (4.29)*** 
 Count of other major illnesses -0.567 -0.555 -0.640 -0.704 -0.718 
  (2.97)*** (2.90)*** (3.88)*** (4.28)*** (4.15)*** 
Subjective health risks      
 Subjective risk, same illness -1.115 -1.116 -1.411 -1.397 -1.471 
  (10.54)*** (10.56)*** (15.42)*** (15.28)*** (15.20)*** 
 Avg. subjective risk, other illness -0.039 -0.043 0.269 0.272 0.202 
  (0.25) (0.28) (2.01)** (2.04)** (1.43) 
 Avg. room to impr. health habits -0.973 -0.974 -0.976 -0.935 -0.931 
  (7.40)*** (7.41)*** (8.60)*** (8.27)*** (7.79)*** 
Latency Period      
 Stated latency - - -0.250 -0.204 -0.251 
    (2.22)** (3.09)*** (3.57)*** 
 (Stated latency)2 - - -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
    (0.78) (3.97)*** (6.36)*** 
 (Stated latency)*(Age) - - -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 
    (3.50)*** (3.42)*** (2.33)** 
 (Stated latency)*(Age2) - - 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
    (2.77)*** (0.58) (0.82) 
 (Stated latency) *1(Female) - - -0.025 -0.025 -0.019 
    (3.25)*** (3.20)*** (2.30)** 
Respondent’s household structure      
 Size of household -0.118 - - - - 
  (0.88)     
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 1(Have kids) -1.987 -2.208 -0.663 -0.673 -0.746 
  (5.38)*** (8.27)*** (2.81)*** (2.86)*** (2.99)*** 
 1(Single parent) -1.858 -1.794 -2.058 -1.993 -1.979 
  (2.20)** (2.15)** (2.85)*** (2.76)*** (2.60)*** 
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.701 0.625 0.754 0.763 0.769 
  (2.87)*** (2.74)*** (3.83)*** (3.88)*** (3.69)*** 
 1(Have current kid at onset) 14.445 14.371 2.557 3.304 3.903 
  (11.11)*** (11.07)*** (2.22)** (2.91)*** (3.24)*** 
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -2.681 -2.601 -2.354 -2.394 -2.679 
  (1.84)* (1.78)* (1.87)* (1.90)* (2.01)** 
 Constant -17.957 -18.157 8.782 6.449 7.290 
   (14.36)*** (14.64)*** (3.55)*** (12.29)*** (13.14)*** 
Observations 12596^ 12596 12596 12596 12596 
Log L     -33818.9 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.35  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
^Sample size is smaller for models in Table A-3 than Table A-2 since they do not include those individuals who said the 
program would never benefit them.   
* Interval-data model treats jiMOEL  as an interval rather than as an approximately continuous variable.  This is done 
using the upper and lower estimates of the stated latency of the benefits of the program and using the intreg command in 
Stata. 
APPENDIX B (to be made available online) 
B.1  Extensive, rather than parsimonious, version of main model 
 
Table 3 in the main body of the paper gives parameter estimates from our model that corrects for 
scenario adjustment where all interaction terms with persistently insignificant coefficients have 
been dropped.  Table B-1 in this Appendix provides the estimates for a model with the complete 
set of interactions. 
B.2  Extensive and parsimonious versions of a “small” model 
 
It may be important to demonstrate that the statistical significance of the interaction terms 
involving the two scenario adjustments variables in this study are not an artifact of the non-linear 
functional form of the specification in the main model.  Tables B-2 and B-3 demonstrate that 
there are significant shifts in the estimated parameters even in simpler five-parameter versions of 
the specification for the program choice model. 
B.3  Under- or over-estimate of latency (ordered discrete variable) 
 
In addition to the interval-data model for the overest variable documented in Model 5 in 
Appendix A, Table A-3, we also considered a second specification for over- or under-estimating 
the latency.  An ordered categorical variable _ jiordered latency  is explored in the context of an 
ordered logit model.  The variable _ jiordered latency  is an ordered categorical variable that takes 
on the value 0 if the upper bound of the age interval checked among the selections in Figure 2 is 
lower than the stated age of onset given in the choice scenario.  It takes the value 1 if the age 
interval checked in Figure 2 contains the stated age of onset, and take a value of 2 if the lower 
bound of the age interval lies strictly above the stated age of onset in the choice scenario.  In 
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these data, latency is underestimated for about 54.6% of illness profiles, and it is overestimated 
for about 10.3% of profiles. 
Results for this model are displayed in Table B-2.  Individuals are more likely to 
overestimate the latency of the illness if they have finished only high school, have temporary or 
long-term pain described the illness profile stated in the scenario, or will likely have a current 
child still in their household at the stated onset of the disease.  Individuals are more likely to 
underestimate the length of the latency if they have a lower income, have either this illness or 
another major illness, have a higher subjective risk for this illness, have children, or will likely 
have a current child still in their household at the stated onset of the disease. 
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Table B-1:  Policy choice model with all interaction terms (Alternatives = 22560) 
 Model A1 Model A2 
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected Corrected 1( )
j
inever   jioverest  
  50 10 first income term   8.387 8.387 -2.702 0.248 
(10.03)*** (10.03)*** (0.76) (4.11)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -2.385 -2.385 10.235 -0.027 
(3.86)*** (3.86)*** (2.95)*** (0.64) 
   10 log 1AS Ai ipdvi    -58.359 -58.359 248.650 7.233 
(5.05)*** (5.05)*** (3.87)*** (7.13)*** 
        13 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi         3.892 3.892 6.055 0.012 (2.15)** (2.15)** (0.60) (0.08) 
   2 log 1AS Ai ipdvr    -51.663 -51.663 -60.728 1.177 
(4.52)*** (4.52)*** (1.12) (1.00) 
   30 log 1AS Ai ipdvl    -1019.412 -1019.412 499.341 5.900 
(4.11)*** (4.11)*** (0.49) (0.36) 
         31 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl    48.701 48.701 -19.464 -0.309 
(4.80)*** (4.80)*** (0.47) (0.41) 
         232 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl    -0.412 -0.412 0.144 0.012 
(4.24)*** (4.24)*** (0.36) (1.47) 
    240 log 1AS Ai ipdvl      339.442 339.442 484.391 -3.979 (3.13)*** (3.13)*** (0.81) (0.41) 
          241 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl      -17.555 -17.555 -7.705 0.308 (3.95)*** (3.95)*** (0.33) (0.72) 
          2242 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvl      0.148 0.148 0.032 -0.006 (3.44)*** (3.44)*** (0.15) (1.24) 
   
 
50 log 1
               log 1
AS A
i i
A
i
pdvi
pdvl
    
   
 
141.815 141.815 -416.324 -13.371 
(1.55) (1.55) (0.89) (1.42) 
      
   
 
51 0 log 1
                          log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
    
   
 
-6.993 -6.993 -0.117 0.434 
(1.95)* (1.95)* (0.01) (1.07) 
      
   
 
2
52 0 log 1
                          log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
    
   
 
0.063 0.063 0.101 -0.005 
(1.85)* (1.85)* (0.58) (1.20) 
Log L -11694.646 -10948.179 
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Table B-2:  Minimal Model (Alternatives = 22560) 
 Model B1 Model B2 
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected Corrected 1( )jinever   jioverest  
  50 10 first income term   5.342 9.991 -1.787 0.409 
(9.17)*** (12.98)*** (0.54) (7.40)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -2.160 -2.014 9.731 -0.026 
(4.61)*** (3.33)*** (2.84)*** (0.64) 
   10 log 1AS Ai ipdvi    -27.053 -37.493 109.601 5.348 
(4.56)*** (4.99)*** (2.75)*** (7.75)*** 
     13 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi          3.297 3.475 5.121 -0.033 (2.29)** (1.90)* (0.50) (0.23) 
   2 log 1AS Ai ipdvr    -21.870 -37.893 -60.407 0.993 
(2.35)** (3.43)*** (1.13) (0.86) 
   3 log 1AS Ai ipdvl    -30.409 -36.974 190.347 6.594 
(5.97)*** (5.89)*** (5.79)*** (11.12)*** 
Log L -11726.31 -11073.051 
 
 
 
 
Table B-3:  Parsimonious Minimal Model (Alternatives = 22560) 
 Model B1’ Model B2’ 
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected Corrected 1( )jinever   jioverest  
  50 10 first income term   5.342 9.816 -1.900 0.387 
(9.17)*** (14.00)*** (0.57) (10.18)*** 
  91 10 second income term   -2.160 -1.800 9.425 - 
(4.61)*** (3.58)*** (2.76)***  
   10 log 1AS Ai ipdvi    -27.053 -37.184 103.398 5.398 
(4.56)*** (4.97)*** (2.72)*** (7.98)*** 
    13 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdvi          3.297 3.786 - - (2.29)** (2.39)**   
   2 log 1AS Ai ipdvr    -21.870 -43.664 - - 
(2.35)** (4.45)***   
   3 log 1AS Ai ipdvl    -30.409 -36.855 188.932 6.619 
(5.97)*** (5.89)*** (5.74)*** (11.22)*** 
Log L -11726.31 -11074.305 
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Table B-4:  Correlates of overest as a discrete variable 
  
  1 – Ordered  
logit  
j
ioverest  
2 – Ordered 
logit  
j
ioverest  
3 – Ordered 
logit  
j
ioverest  
Attributes of illness profile    
 
Duration of pain/disability 
(months if less than 60) 0.004 0.002 0.002 
  (5.05)*** (1.93)* (1.99)** 
 
1(Longterm pain/disability) 
(>60 months) 0.064 0.094 0.095 
  (0.93) (1.30) (1.32) 
Some demographic characteristics of 
respondents    
 Age of respondent (years) 0.036 0.000 - 
  (2.72)*** (0.00)  
 Age-squared (100s of years) -0.029 0.003 - 
  (2.34)** (0.15)  
 1(Female) 0.005 - - 
  (0.09)   
Educational attainment    
 1(Less than HS) -0.939 -0.940 -0.936 
  (6.80)*** (6.68)*** (6.67)*** 
 1(High School) -0.040 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.57) (0.07) (0.10) 
 1(Some College) -0.202 -0.207 -0.209 
  (2.62)*** (2.57)** (2.60)*** 
Objective health status    
 1(Have same illness) -0.679 -0.654 -0.651 
  (3.20)*** (3.01)*** (3.00)*** 
 Count of other major illness -0.119 -0.137 -0.132 
  (2.08)** (2.28)** (2.23)** 
Subjective health risks    
 Subjective risk, same illness -0.132 -0.200 -0.201 
  (4.38)*** (6.25)*** (6.28)*** 
 Subjective risk, other illness -0.081 -0.031 -0.028 
  (1.86)* (0.68) (0.62) 
 
Avg room to improve health 
habits -0.155 -0.174 -0.178 
  (4.30)*** (4.59)*** (4.72)*** 
Latency Period    
 Stated latency - 0.013 0.010 
   (0.24) (0.31) 
 Stated latency squared - -0.003 -0.003 
   (6.86)*** (7.70)*** 
 Latency and age interaction - 0.003 0.002 
   (1.35) (1.86)* 
 
Latency and age squared 
interaction - -0.000 -0.000 
   (3.19)*** (4.71)*** 
    
Continued...    
Respondent’s household structure    
 19
 Size of household -0.011 - - 
  (0.29)   
 1(Have kids) -0.284 -0.097 - 
  (2.64)*** (1.13)  
 1(Single parent) -1.204 -1.319 -1.387 
  (2.80)*** (3.06)*** (3.25)*** 
 1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids) 0.107 0.120 0.107 
  (1.55) (1.82)* (1.67)* 
 1(Have kid at onset) 1.809 0.155 - 
  (6.80)*** (1.03)  
 1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -0.330 - - 
  (1.13)   
Observations 12596 12596 12596 
Log L -4259.161 -3697.929 -3698.915 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
